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the opt-out, and closer cooperation itself has given 
rise to a suggestion (or fear) of 'Europe a la Carte' -
according to which states would pick and choose 
which policies they would participate in-as yet this 
has not materialized. EMILY REID 
See also: European constitution; European treaties 
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Coase, Ronald The work of economist Ronald 
Coase (1910-) transformed legal scholars' approach-
es to social policy, and spurred economists to focus 
attention on how institutions function. When Coase 
received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991, the 
Nobel Committee cited two key articles concerning 
Coase's pioneering notion of'transaction cost'. 
In 'The Nature of the Firm', Coase pointed out 
when an entrepreneur decides between purchasing 
a factor of production through the market, or mak-
ing the needed item himself, the decision will turn 
on the comparative costs of transacting. That is, an 
entrepreneur who goes the market route must bear 
transaction costs such as searching for sources of 
supply, comparing and verifying qualities of goods, 
and negotiating contracts. If instead an entrepre-
neur goes the route of creating a firm to manufac-
ture the factor in-house, she must bear costs such 
as searching for potential employees and moni-
toring their performance. Understanding these 
transaction costs can both help us understand the 
size, shape and nature of firms, and make recom-
mendations as to institutional structures that will 
facilitate economic growth. 
In 'The Problem of Social Cost', Coase examined 
the problem ofintersecting activities that cause harm 
to each other. Economist Arthur Pigou suggested 
that the government should impose a tax or dam-
ages on the active party (for example, on the factory 
emitting the pollution) to make that party's private 
costs equal the social costs. The liable party would 
then purportedly choose a socially optimal path as 
it compared the social costs of its activity with the 
profits it anticipated. Coase showed that in many 
circumstances-depending on transaction costs-
this rigid Pigovian rule would not achieve maximum 
productivity: that harms are the consequence of two 
activities interacting, and that the optimal route 
might involve a combination of changed activities by 
all parties. 
Coase argued that in a world without transac-
tion costs, it would not matter who bore the legal 
liability: for example, if the factory bore the liability 
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but its neighbours could better lower costs, the fac-
tory would pay the neighbours to take the needed 
action. However, in the real world, where transac-
tion costs are everywhere, the party bearing the lia-
bility might find it too costly to negotiate contracts 
with its neighbours, and might instead respond to 
the legal rule by curtailing production in a way that 
was socially inefficient. 
The latter discussion gave rise to the so-called 
'Coase Theorem' (so named by co-Laureate, George 
Stigler). It postulates that in the absence of transac-
tion costs, parties will bargain to an efficient solution 
regardless of which parties receive rights through 
law. Coase is sometimes misunderstood as suggest-
ing that law is unimportant. To the contrary: the 
point ofCoase's exploring how resources would flow 
in a world without transaction costs was to underline 
the crucial role that transaction costs play in under-
standing how law's effects play out. 
Coase suggested that judges could legitimately 
seek to foster the flow of resources to their most 
productive uses. Notably, judges could deploy the 
allocation of rights for purposes such as placing 
resources initially in productive hands, and lower-
ing transaction costs so that misplaced and under-
valued resources can be easily transferred. Law can 
do these things directly, and by affecting the shape 
of institutions. 
For lawyers, Coase's work functioned as if to 
strip the social world to its elemental atoms. Schol-
ars could track the way different legal rules affected 
resource use and the shape of institutions, and seek 
to affect the 'chemical reactions' directly. The result-
ant intoxication rewrote the history of law schools 
for the next fifty years, under the rubric of 'Law and 
Economics'. Others responsible for the growth of the 
field include Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner. 
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Code Napoleon The Code Napoleon (as the 
French Civil Code was known) is the most influ-
ential European legal document since Justinian's 
Digest of 532 AD. Promulgated in 1804, it created the 
unity of French private law. Previously, the private 
law of France had consisted in a set of customs estab-
lished and enforced by regional parlements, which 
had limited similarities one to another. Some were 
based on local customary law and some on Roman 
law, together with canon law influences. The result 
was that private law varied from one part of France 
to another. 
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